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Why Do Australian Firms Issue Standalone Warrants? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines why Australian firms issue standalone warrants and how the market perceives 
this type of capital raising method. We find that firms with smaller size, smaller issue proceeds, 
higher risk and lower ownership concentration choose standalone warrants rather than rights issues 
of equity to raise equity capital. Price reactions to standalone warrant announcements are 
significantly and positively related to takeup and underwriting status consistent with the findings of 
Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (JFE, 2008) for the announcements of rights issues of equity. 
Price reactions are stronger for moderately out-of-the-money warrants than in-the-money and 
deeply out-of-the-money warrants. We also find that managers of larger/moderate/smaller firms 
with higher/moderate/lower pre-event RUNUP and lower/moderate/higher risk choose in-the-
money/ moderately-out-of-the-money/deeply out-of-the money warrants. 
 
Keywords:  Rights issue of equity; Rights issue of warrants; Takeup; Underwriting; Ownership 
concentration 
JEL Classifications:   G14; G32 
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1. Introduction 
 
Australian companies are not allowed to issue more than 15% of their capital without the 
prior approval of shareholders unless the issue is made to existing shareholders on a proportionate 
(pro rata) basis. As such, public offerings of seasoned firms are rare or non- existent in Australia. 
Thus, seasoned Australian firms use rights offerings of equity or rights offerings of standalone 
warrants (delayed equity) to existing shareholders to raise equity capital. Australian firms do not 
issue unit offerings (known as stock-warrant package offerings) to existing shareholders.1 To the 
best of our knowledge, the Australian market is the only developed market where standalone 
warrants are utilized to raise new equity capital.  Prior research shows that the market reacts 
positively to standalone warrants [Suchard (1995)] and negatively to rights offerings of equity 
[Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008)].  
Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008) argue that alternative forms of rights offering 
provide a potentially rich tapestry of credible signals about the varying quality of issuing 
companies. Byoun and Moore (1993) argue that the sequencing model of Mayer (1998) has 
implications for warrant financing as warrant financing will reduce the agency costs of free cash 
flow (Jensen (1986)). Gajewski, Ginglinger and Lasfer (2007) suggest that the agency costs of the 
free cash flow hypothesis predicts that managers have to set the exercise price of warrants higher 
than the share price prior to the announcement in order to indicate that the firm has worthwhile 
projects to obtain second stage financing. This paper examines why some Australian firms issue 
standalone warrants to existing shareholders rather than rights offerings of equity and whether 
Australian managers can use alternative forms of standalone warrants to signal their quality by 
incorporating the credible quality signals identified by Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008) use 
standalone warrants to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow as argued by Byoun and Moore 
(1993) and Gajewski et al (2007) in their work on packaged offerings of equity with warrants.  
                                                 
1 Some firms issue bonus warrants (nil paid) with a rights issue of equity as a sweetener. 
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A number of studies examine seasoned firms’ choices as between equity offerings and unit 
offerings [Byoun and Moore (2003 and 2004), Gajewski, Ginglinger and Lasfer (2007)].2 Byoun 
and Moore (2003 and 2004) show that unit offerings rather than standalone equity are issued by 
firms with higher information asymmetry with the following characteristics: small, young firms 
with small proceeds; high-risk, with low-prestige underwriters; and fewer fixed assets. Byoun and 
Moore (2003) demonstrate that including warrants with equity offerings will increase the abnormal 
returns above those generated by issuing equity alone. Considering that rights offerings of equity 
are associated with a negative price reaction and rights offerings of standalone warrants experience 
a positive price reaction, surprisingly no studies have examined seasoned firms’ issue choice 
between equity offerings and standalone warrants. This study attempts to examine this significant 
omission in the literature. 
Typically, in Australia, standalone warrants are issued as rights issues. A shareholder 
receives the warrants for a favorably small price with the right to purchase the stock at the 
predetermined exercise price which is generally out-of-the-money at the time of issuance. Thus, 
very little money is received by the company at the time of issuance of warrants. By issuing 
warrants firms pre-commit to yet another seasoned offering at the exercise price of warrants. When 
a company grows, it will most likely need new equity capital. Also, growth will bring about an 
increase in stock price resulting in the exercise of the warrants. On the other hand, if the firm 
experiences lackluster growth, its stock price is unlikely to increase and the warrants will not be 
exercised. As such, managers will undertake positive NPV projects using the warrant proceeds as 
the second stage financing is conditional on stock price appreciation and they have to demonstrate 
that the firm has worthwhile projects in order to obtain the second round of financing. We argue 
that the market will perceive positively  the announcement of out-of-the-money warrants offerings 
                                                 
2 Byoun and Moore (2003) and Gajewski, Ginglinger and Lasfer (2007) show that the market reacts negatively to public 
offerings of stock-warrant packages whereas Gajewski et al (2007) show that the market reaction is positive but 
insignificant to rights offerings of stock-warrants units.   
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(i.e. with the ratio of exercise price to stock price greater than one) as this will indicate the 
potentiality of firms’ growth opportunities. 
Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008) examine the interrelations between takeup, 
underwriting status, renounceability, and subscription price discount on the choice of rights issue 
method and show that management can signal firm quality to shareholders. They find that the 
market reaction is positively related to underwriting status and shareholders’ takeup and negatively 
related to the subscription price discount. They also find that firms with higher ownership 
concentration, larger subscription price discount, stronger pre-announcement returns, smaller issues 
relative to old shares and larger market capitalizations have higher shareholder takeup. However, no 
studies have examined the role of underwriting status or shareholders’ takeup or the exercise price 
of the warrants on the issuance of standalone warrants. Thus, this study also investigates the role of 
underwriting status, shareholders takeup and the exercise price of warrants on price reactions to the 
announcement of standalone warrants. 
An analysis of standalone warrants is of interest and importance for a number of reasons. 
Standalone warrants provide a cost-effective financing arrangement for small firms which are 
particularly suited to firms in the natural resources sector with valuable growth options.  The quality 
of firms is likely to be a major factor in explaining the market response to rights offerings of equity 
in Australia [See Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008), and, as such it will be interesting to 
know how managers use these quality features in designing the standalone warrants, and how the 
market reacts to them. Warrants financing also has implications for the reduction in the agency 
costs of free cash flow. Thus, we address the following research questions in this study: What 
factors determine the choice between the standalone rights issue of warrants and standalone rights 
issues of equity? Does the market reaction vary between fully underwritten and non-underwritten 
issues of standalone warrants? What are the underlying factors that induce managers to fully 
underwrite rights issues of standalone warrants? What are the factors that determine the degree of 
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moneyness (exercise price to share price ratio) of standalone warrants? Does the takeup of 
shareholders have any impact on the market reaction to warrants? What are the factors that 
determine the shareholders’ takeup of warrants?   
 We find that firms with smaller size, higher risk, lower ownership concentration and firms 
looking for smaller issue proceeds tend to choose rights issues of warrants rather than rights issues 
of equity when raising equity capital in Australia.  The announcement of standalone warrant 
issuance is met with a positive stock price reaction (consistent with Suchard (1995)), whereas rights 
issues of equity experienced negative price reactions (consistent with Balachandran et al (2008)). 
Moderately out-of-the-money issues have more positive abnormal returns, whereas those that are 
in-the-money (deeply out-of-the-money) have insignificant (significantly negative) abnormal 
returns. Underwriting status, firms’ growth opportunities and shareholders takeup of warrants are 
positively related with the price reaction to standalone warrant announcements.  
 The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses that underpin our 
empirical analyses. Section 3 describes our sample and research design. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results on i) the issue choice between standalone warrants and standalone equity, ii) 
differential market reactions to the announcement of standalone warrants and equity, iii) factors that 
determine the shareholders takeup of standalone warrants, iv) factors that determine the moneyness 
of standalone warrants, and v) factors that determine the decision to underwrite the standalone 
warrants. Finally, our conclusions are presented in section 5. 
 
2.   Hypothesis Development 
Prior studies have examined the signaling characteristics of the two stages of the financing of unit 
offerings. How and Howe (2001) show that, after controlling for the fraction of equity retained by 
insiders, the proportion of the firms sold as warrants increases with the firm riskiness in Australian 
IPOs. Byoun and Moore (2003 and 2004) show that firms with high information asymmetry 
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(smaller size and higher risk firms) include warrants in their seasoned equity offerings. These 
arguments then lead to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Firms with higher information asymmetry will choose standalone warrants rather than 
standalone rights issue of equity 
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) argue that high quality firms would choose fully underwritten 
rights issues since they would be prepared to pay the full investigation costs, thereby accruing a net 
benefit from the eventual issue. In the context of rights offerings of equity, Balachandran et al 
(2008) argue that a quality signal will be inherent within the choice of underwriting status, while 
Balachandran et al (2008) and Slovin et al (2000), argue that the higher subscription price (lower 
discount) can also serve as a quality signal.  Essentially, managers will select issue methods from 
the total opportunity set which signal the quality and/or degree of undervaluation of the existing 
stock in issue. In the context of unit of offerings of IPO, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) argue 
that it is optimal for high quality firms to issue warrants to finance future growth opportunities. 
They also suggest that their model is applicable to seasoned issues of equity packaged with 
warrants. Thus we expect that the price reaction to standalone warrants will be positively related 
with underwriting and moneyness of warrants (the ratio of exercise price to pre-announcement 
price). 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) argue that a high expected takeup reduces the adverse selection 
problem associated with equity issuance and Singh (1997) that higher takeup levels should be 
associated with relatively more favorable information. Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) and 
Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008) show that shareholder takeup is positively related with the 
price response to rights issues of equity. Therefore we expect that shareholders takeup of warrants 
will be positively related with the price reaction to the announcement of standalone warrants. 
Mayers (1998) argues more generally that the usage of warrants can be beneficial via 
reducing dysfunctional overinvestment behavior. Schultz (1993) and Byoun and Moore (1993), 
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further, argue that incorporating warrants into equity offerings will reduce agency costs of free cash 
flow.  Gajewski et al (2007) suggest that managers have to set the exercise price of warrants higher 
than the share price prior to the announcement in order to indicate that the firm has worthwhile 
projects in order to obtain second stage financing consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow 
hypothesis, previously mentioned. Thus, we have the following hypotheses: 
H2 (a): Price reactions to underwritten warrant issues will be more favorable than to non-
underwritten warrants issues, consistent with the signaling hypothesis. 
H2 (b):   Price reactions to warrant announcements will be positively related with firms’ 
growth opportunities, consistent with signaling and free cash flow hypotheses.   
 H2 (c):   Shareholder takeup of warrants will be positively related with price reactions to the 
announcements of warrants.  
H2 (d):   Price reactions to warrant announcements will be more favorable for out-of-the-
money warrants than for in-the-money warrants, consistent with signaling and free 
cash flow hypotheses.   
 
 
3.0  Research Design 
In this section, we describe the sample selection procedure, and the characteristics of our standalone 
warrants and equity samples. We then outline the probit model used to examine the issue choice 
between standalone warrants and standalone equity, and the event study methodology used to 
examine the market reaction to the announcement of standalone warrants and equity. 
 
3.1 Data and Sample 
Announcement dates of standalone rights issue of warrants and standalone rights issues of equity of 
Australian companies are collected from Bloomberg, DatAnalysis and IRESS. We identify the clean 
sample of 105 announcements of rights issues of standalone warrants and 560 standalone rights 
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issues of equity during the 1997-2008 period that meet the following criteria: standalone warrants 
can be converted into ordinary shares at the predetermined exercised price; warrants are issued only 
to ordinary shareholders on a pro rata basis; shareholders have to purchase the warrants at a pre-
determined price (price of the warrant); standalone warrants and standalone rights issues of equity 
are not announced simultaneously with any other announcements, such as: mergers, takeovers, 
restructuring, on-market buybacks, off market buybacks, stock dividends, stock splits, private 
placements, public offerings, convertible bonds convertible preference shares, and bonus warrants; 
and share prices are available for the estimation period and announcement period (-260 to +1). We 
find that 52 (340) of the warrants (rights issue of equity) are fully underwritten, and 10 (219) of the 
warrants (rights issue of equity) are renounceable rights issues. 
We used the DatAnalysis database to verify the issue price of the warrant, the exercise price 
of the warrants to convert into shares, information on underwriting and the expiry dates of the 
warrants. The market value of the company, share price data adjusted for dividends and Australian 
all ordinary share index data are obtained from the Datastream database. Data on ownership 
concentration, shareholders takeup of warrants and other financial data were collected from 
DatAnalysis database. 
Insert Table 1 Here 
Table 1 provides a summary of the composition of our sample, with Panel A providing the 
year-wise distribution of our sample and Panel B a categorization on the basis of industry sectors. 
Approximately 60% (30%) of standalone warrants (equity) belongs to the Materials group, 12% 
(11%) to health care and 10% (10%) to energy.   
Insert Table 2 Here 
In table 2, we provide descriptive statistics of the characteristics of our sample firms and the 
issue details. As can be seen in table 2, market value, total assets and debt ratio are statistically 
significantly smaller for firms which choose standalone warrants rather than standalone equity 
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whereas idiosyncratic risk is higher for firms which choose standalone warrants rather than 
standalone equity.  This evidence supports H1 in that firms with higher information asymmetry or 
lower quality choose standalone warrants rather than standalone equity. We also find that firms with 
higher ownership concentration, larger offer proceeds and poor pre-event period returns choose 
standalone rights issue of equity. 
 
 
3.2  Probit Model for the issuance choice - warrants versus equity 
We examine the factors determining the issuance choice of rights issues of standalone warrants 
versus rights issues of equity using probit model. The dependent variable, DSW, takes a value of one 
for standalone warrants and zero for standalone rights issues of equity. The independent variables are 
RUNUP: raw return for one year period prior to the announcement date (return from -260 to day -2); 
IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of the market model regression of 
daily stock returns over the period from day-260 to day -61; LMV: the logarithm of the market value of 
the issuing firm one month prior to the announcement;   Top20: the proportion of shares held by top 20 
shareholders; BH: Blockholders (holders of 5% or more) ownership; and DEBTRATIO: the total debt 
to total assets. 
 
3.3 Event study methodology 
This study uses the event study framework to examine the impact of standalone warrant and 
standalone equity announcements upon share prices. The daily returns are measured in logarithmic 
form adjusted for dividends. Abnormal returns are generated for the day before the announcement 
date to the day after the announcement (day -1 to day 1). The market model (hereafter MM) is used 
to estimate the abnormal returns. The estimation period used in this study runs from 260 days prior 
to the announcement day to 61 days before the announcement day (day –260 to day –61).  The 
Australian All Ordinaries Share Index is used as the market proxy.  
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4.0 Empirical results  
This section provides empirical results. Section 4.1 discusses the empirical results as regards the 
issue choice between standalone warrants and standalone equity, using a probit model. Section 4.2 
discusses market reactions to the announcement of standalone warrants and equity, and the factors 
that determine the market reaction to standalone warrants.  Section 4.3 examines the factors that 
determine the shareholders takeup of standalone warrants, while Section 4.4 examines the factors 
that determine the moneyness (exercise price to pre announcement share price) of standalone 
warrants. Section 4.5 examines the factors that determine the decision to underwrite the standalone 
warrants.  
 
4.1 Determinants of issuance choice - warrants versus equity 
In this section, we discusses the empirical findings of the factors determining the issuance choice of 
rights issues of standalone warrants versus rights issues of equity. Our empirical findings reported 
in Table 3 show that firms with large market capitalizations tend to favor rights issues of equity 
over standalone warrants. Firms with high idiosyncratic risk issue standalone warrants in preference 
to rights offerings of equity.  Firms making large issues, as measured by TOPTOMV and LNOP, 
use rights issues of equity rather than standalone warrants. We have some (weak) evidence 
indicating that firms with higher leverage (DEBTRATIO) have a preference for rights issue of 
equity. These results support our H1. That is, firms with higher degrees of information asymmetry 
choose warrants issues than standalone equity. We also find that firms with more concentrated 
ownership structures, as reflected by the variables Top 20 and BH, opt for rights issues of equity 
rather than warrants which is consistent with an asymmetric information argument, in that such 
firms would normally be expected to have lower degrees of such asymmetries due to their 
potentially more informed stockholders. We find that firms experiencing a positive run-up in stock 
prices in the year prior to the announcement date prefer standalone warrants which suggest firms 
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with better pre-event runup choose standalone warrants rather than standalone equity to use pre-
runup momentum to attract shareholders to purchase the more levered warrants.  
Insert Table 3 Here 
Overall, our results confirm that standalone warrants are the issue of choice for smaller, 
risky firms with less concentrated ownership. Firms issuing standalone warrants also tend to be less 
levered.    
 
4.2 Price reactions 
Section 4.2.1 provides market reactions to the announcement of standalone warrants and equity. 
Section 4.2.2 examines the factors that determine the market reaction to standalone warrants.  
 
4.2.1 Univariate results - Announcement effects 
Panel A of table 4 provides price reactions to the announcements of rights issue of standalone 
equity and standalone warrants for the event window (-1, +1).  The rights issue of equity 
experiences statistically significant negative abnormal returns [mean (median) of -1.82% (-0.46%)], 
whereas the announcers of standalone warrants, in contrast, earn statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns [mean (median) of 1.95% (0.59%)].  These results are consistent with those 
reported in past studies on Australian data, that is, Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008) for 
equity issues and Suchard (2005) for warrants.   
Insert Table 4 Here 
The divergence in market reaction between the two samples of rights issues of equity and 
rights issue of standalone warrants issuers is a key finding and deserves further attention. We probe 
this further in Panels B, C and D of table 4. When we partition the sample of rights issues of equity 
into those issues with a discount and those issues with a zero discount or premium, we find that the 
market reacts significantly negatively to issues with discounts [mean (median) of -2.37% (-0.71%)] 
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and significantly positively to issues with no discounts [mean (median) of 1.77% (063%)]. When 
we partition the sample of rights issue of warrants into those issues which are in-the-money and 
those issues which are out-of-the-money, we find that market reacts insignificantly to in-the-money 
issues and significantly positively to out-of-the-money issues [mean (median) of 2.48% (0.72%)].  
We also examine whether the market reaction differs between out-of-the-money warrants 
and rights issues with premium or zero discount and find no significant difference between them. In 
our sample we find that 88% of the rights issues of equity are issued with a discount whereas 78% 
of rights issues of warrants are issued out-of-the money. It raises an interesting question as to why 
managers chose rights offerings of equity with a discount rather standalone  out-of-the-money 
warrants ,given that the market preference   is for issues at the money or a premium irrespective of 
type of the offerings: equity or warrants. That is, as we have shown in section 4, riskier, smaller 
firms with smaller issue proceeds tend to choose warrants rather than equity. Balachandran et al 
(2008) have shown that shareholders takeup is positively related with subscription price discount 
for equity rights issues. Taking together all these results shows that firms with large offer proceeds 
have to underprice the offerings to attract shareholder takeup. However, riskier firms with smaller 
offer proceeds choose standalone warrants which are out-of-the-money to signal future growth 
opportunities. 
In panel D of table 4, we analyze the price reactions of firms issuing warrants into three 
subgroups: in-the-money (EPTOSP is less than 1), moderately out-of-the-money (EPTOSP ranging 
between 1 and 2), deeply out-of-the-money (issues with EPTOSP exceeding 2.0). Deeply out-of-
the-money issues experience statistically significantly negative abnormal returns whereas 
moderately out-of-the-money issues show strongly positive abnormal returns. Our results indicate 
that though the market likes issues which are out-of-the-money it dislikes the issues with deep out-
of-the-money offerings, potentially indicating that the market views these issues will be more likely 
to expire out-of-the-money. 
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Further, we examine in table 5 the impact of underwriting status and shareholders takeup on 
price reactions to standalone warrants.  As can be seen in panel A of Table 5, the underwritten 
subsample has a higher abnormal return as compared to the non-underwritten subsample with the 
difference being significant at the 10% level, consistent with H2 (a).  In Panel B, we compare the 
abnormal returns of firms with low takeup to those of high takeup. The results show that the 
significantly positive abnormal returns are experienced by firms with high takeup (where takeup ≥ 
median) while the low takeup group experience insignificant abnormal returns; this abnormal return 
significantly differs between these two groups at the 5% level.   This result is consistent with H2(c). 
The results reported for the impact of shareholders takeup of warrants is consistent with the 
evidence documented by Balachandran et al. (2008) and Slovin et al (2000) for shareholders takeup 
of rights issue of equity. In Panel C, we compare the abnormal returns of firms between 
renounceable and non-renounceable issue of warrants. The results show that the market reaction 
does not vary between renounceable and non-renounceable issue of warrants consistent with the 
findings of Balachandran et al. (2008) for rights issues of equity.  
Insert Table 5 Here 
Overall, we find support for a positive price reaction to warrant announcements and that 
underwriting and takeup effects exist per H2 (a) and H2(c), respectively. The price reactions 
indicate that the market prefers warrant issues that are out of the money, but not too deeply so, 
providing little support for H2 (d).  
 
4.2.2 Robustness Check 
In this section we examine why managers choose deep out of the warrants. Univariate results are 
reported in table 6 for subgroups classified on the basis of being in the money, moderately out-of-
the-money and deeply out-of-the-money warrants with underwriting status. As can be seen in table 
6, the market reaction is positive for underwritten warrants irrespective of the status of their 
moneyness. However, the market reaction is strongest for moderately out-of-the-money warrants 
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followed by in-the-money warrants and is least positive for the deeply out-of-the-money case. In the 
case of non-underwritten (uninsured) warrants, the market reaction is positive for in-the-money 
warrants and negative for moderately and deeply out-of-the-money warrants.  
Insert Table 6 Here 
It raises an interesting question as to why managers choose deeply out-of-the-money warrants or in-
the-money warrants. A close inspection of table 6 shows that larger/moderate/smaller firms with 
higher/moderate/lower pre-event RUNUP and lower/moderate/higher risk choose in-the-money/ 
moderately-out-of-the-money/deeply out-of-the money warrants. As can be seen in Panel B of table 
6, shareholders’ takeup of warrants is stronger for underwritten warrants than non-underwritten 
warrants irrespective of the moneyness category. 
 
4.2.3 Cross sectional analysis of price reaction 
In this section, we report the cross-sectional relations between the three-day abnormal returns 
surrounding announcements of rights issue of standalone warrants and equity and a range of 
potential explanatory independent variables justified either via our hypothesis development or usage 
in the extant literature. The independent variables considered are: LTOPTOMV: the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of total proceeds to market value; DFU takes a value of one for fully 
underwritten rights issues of equity/standalone warrants and zero otherwise; DRIGHTS takes a 
value of one for standalone rights issues of equity and zero for standalone warrants; DSW takes a value 
of one for standalone warrants and zero for standalone rights issues of equity. TAKEUP: actual 
percentage of takeup of the standalone equity/warrants; DEPTOSP12: a dummy variable equal to 
unity if EPTOSP takes a value  between 1 and 2; EPTOSP: the exercise price divided by share price 
two days before the announcement date; DIMOM takes a value of unity if EPTOSP is greater than or 
equal to one otherwise zero; IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of the 
market model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day-260 to day -61; LTA: the 
logarithm of the total assets prior to the announcement;  Top20: the proportion of shares held by top 20 
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shareholders; DEBTRATIO: the total debt to total assets; RUNUP: raw return for the one year period 
prior to the announcement date (return from -260 to day -2) and DDISC: takes a value of 1 if a rights 
issue of equity is made  with a zero discount or premium and zero otherwise. 
Insert Table 7 Here 
The results are reported in Table 7 for models 1 to 14 for the total sample (warrants and 
equity) and models 16 to 18 for standalone warrants. The results reported in table 6 confirm the 
findings in section 4.2.1. That is, a significantly negative coefficient for DRIGHTS confirms that 
the market reaction is more favorable to standalone warrants than to standalone rights issues of 
equity. The significantly positive coefficient for DRIGHTS*DDISC and DSW*DIMOM confirms 
that the market prefers rights issues that are at the money or with a premium irrespective of the type 
of offerings either warrants or equity. Comparing the models 4, 5 and 6 confirms that the market 
reaction is stronger for moderately out-of-the-money than in-the-money and deeply out-of-the-
money warrants. LTOPTOMV has significantly negative coefficients, indicating that larger the 
issue more negative price reaction. Significantly positive coefficients for takeup and DFU confirm 
their role as quality signals for total sample as well as standalone warrant sample.   
As such, then, the results reported in this section provide further corroboration for the results 
in Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, and the Hypotheses developed in Section 2. 
 
4.3 Determinants of shareholders’ takeup of warrants 
As outlined in section 2, takeup signifies the success of the issue and is significantly affected by the 
quality and information asymmetry characteristics of the firm. The TAKEUP variable captures the 
actual response of shareholders to the standalone warrants issue. Therefore, in this section, we 
model the factors determining takeup using Tobit models and report the results in table 8.      
Insert Table 8 Here 
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The dependent variable employed is the actual percentage of takeup of the warrants. We 
find that underwritten status is a significantly positive influence upon the TAKEUP of the 
standalone warrants offerings, whereas the riskiness of the firm, the “moneyness” of the warrants 
(ratio of exercise price to stock price (EPTOSP) and size of the offerings (LTOPTOMV or LNOP) 
negatively influences the TAKEUP. It appears that shareholders favorably regard the 
quality/information asymmetry and attractiveness of the issue when deciding to purchase warrants.   
 
4.4   Factors determine the moneyness of Warrants  
Managers will attempt to select the optimal exercise price in order to achieve a favorable response 
from shareholders.  If they set the exercise price too high they signal a high quality issue but 
potentially increase the possibility of an undersubscription, for example.  We model the ratio of 
exercise price to share price (EPTOSP) incorporating the quality perception effects, option 
parameters, and potential dilution effects and report the results in Table 9.  
Insert Table 9 Here 
Our empirical tests indicate that the underwriting status, as signified by DFU, has a 
significantly positive effect on the dependent variable EPTOSP.  The term to maturity of the 
warrants (TTM) and the total risk variable (STDEV) both have positive impacts on EPTOSP.  That 
is, firms set higher exercise prices when the warrants have a longer time to maturity due to the fact 
that the probability the option will close in-the-money is higher, the longer the maturity date.  The 
higher the volatility of the underlying the higher the chance a more out-of-the-money option will 
expire in-the-money and  thus firms with higher STDEVs set higher exercise prices. These findings 
are in accordance with the general option type features and characteristics which would indicate that 
out-of-the-moneyness should be directly related to the time to maturity and volatility of underlying 
stock price.  LTOPTOMV has a negative effect on EPTOSP indicating that firms set higher exercise 
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prices for bigger issues. A significantly negative coefficient for TOP20 indicates that firms with 
higher ownership concentrations are reluctant to set higher exercise prices. 
Overall, our results indicate that managers attribute importance to the quality of the issue, in 
addition to the option parameters such as time to maturity and underlying volatility while setting the 
exercise price of warrants.   
4.5 Determinants of the Underwriting Decision 
We model factors affecting a firm’s decision to underwrite standalone warrant issues using a 
probit framework.  We conjecture that the quality of the issue and the information asymmetry 
associated with the firm, will affect the decision regarding underwriting the issue.  Our results are 
reported in Table 10.   
Insert Table 10 Here 
Out-of-the-moneyness (EPTOSP) is directly associated with the decision to choose 
underwriting. We find a non-linear relationship between holdings of top 20 shareholders (Top 20) 
and the decision to underwrite.  The positive impact of the variable Top 20 is attributed to the 
lowering of information asymmetry. The negative effect of the square of top 20 holdings implies the 
decreasing importance of underwriting for firms with very high ownership concentration. Since 
large blockholders have strong incentives to subscribe to the issue in order to preclude an 
attenuation of their control premia, underwriting is of no value to the firm with higher end 
ownership concentration. .  
 
 
5.0  Conclusion 
The Australian market is the only market in a developed country that utilizes standalone warrants to 
raise new equity capital. The positive market reaction to standalone warrants as opposed to the 
negative reaction of rights offerings of equity motivates our study. Our empirical results also 
support the view that firms with higher information asymmetry (small firms, high risk firms, and 
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those with low ownership concentration) choose standalone warrants over rights issue of equity. We 
also document support for the signaling hypothesis based on a more favorable stock price reaction 
to underwritten issues and firms with higher shareholder takeup of warrants consistent with the 
findings of Balachandran, Faff and Theobald (2008) for the announcements of rights issue of 
equity. The price reaction to standalone warrant issue announcements is stronger for moderately 
out-of-the money warrants than for in-the-money and deeply out-of-the-money warrants. Managers 
of larger/moderate/smaller firms with higher/moderate/lower pre-event RUNUP and 
lower/moderate/higher risk choose in-the-money/moderately-out-of-the-money/deeply out-of-the 
money warrants. Our findings have strong implications for managers in choosing to issue 
standalone warrants.  
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Table 1: Summary of rights issue of equity and rights issue of standalone warrant Announcements 
This table provides the distribution of the number of rights issue of equity and rights issue of standalone warrant 
Announcements made by Australian companies during the period 1997 to 2008. Panel A provides information based on 
year wise classification. Panel B provides information based on industry sector basis.  
Panel A – Year wise classification 
Year Rights issue of equity Rights issue of standalone warrants 
1997 40 12 
1998 39 09 
1999 41 11 
2000 20 12 
2001 46 05 
2002 40 08 
2003 59 06 
2004 45 06 
2005 51 06 
2006 48 13 
2007 62 10 
2008 69 07 
Total 560 105 
Panel B – Industry Classification 
GICS Industry Sectors Rights issue of equity Rights issue of standalone warrants 
Consumer Discretionary 54 03 
Industrials 56 05 
Financials 63 06 
Energy 57 11 
Consumer Staples 30 - 
Health Care  64 13 
Material 171 63 
Information Technology 43 03 
Telecommunication Services 17 01 
Utilities 5 - 
Total 560 105 
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Table 2: Firms’ characteristics: rights issue of equity, and rights issue of standalone warrants 
This table provides univariate tests across two groups: rights issue of equity, and rights issue of standalone warrants. The table also 
provides non-parametric, Mann Whitney (MW test) test statistics for the difference in median values of firms’ characteristics 
between rights issue of equity, and rights issue of standalone warrants. BM: the book-to-market ratio measured as book value of assets 
to market value of assets;  MV: the market value of the issuing firm one month prior to the announcement; TOPTOMV: the total proceed 
to market value; OP: the offer proceeds;  RUNUP: raw return for one-year period prior to the announcement date (return from –260 to day 
–2); IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of the market model regression of daily stock returns over the period 
from day –260 to day –61 for each issuing company; Top20: the proportion of shares held by top 20 shareholders;  BH: the proportion of 
shares held by blockholders;  DEBTRATIO: the total debt to total assets; EQUITYTOTA: shareholders equity to total assets; and TA: the 
total assets. * Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. 
  Rights issue of equity 
Rights issue of 
standalone warrants MW test 
BM Mean 
Median 
0.75 
0.67 
0.75 
0.61 
0.95 
MV ($M) Mean 
Median 
90.88 
14.01 
19.04 
8.57 
3.24*** 
TOPTOMV Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
45.05 
26.82 
10.94 
7.68 
11.59*** 
OP ($M) Mean 
Median 
14.89 
4.05 
1.44 
0.54 
12.26*** 
RUNUP Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
-14.00 
-17.51 
-0.56 
-2.90 
3.64*** 
IDYRISK Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
5.39 
5.03 
6.47 
6.13 
4.38*** 
Top 20 Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
61.75 
62.00 
55.62 
54.68 
3.35*** 
BH Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
37.75 
36.45 
28.98 
25.27 
3.80*** 
DEBTRATIO Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
15.87 
4.38 
8.72 
0.00 
5.10*** 
TA ($M) Mean 
Median 
91.24 
14.88 
14.52 
6.43 
6.50*** 
EQUITYTOTA Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
62.44 
70.40 
79.11 
93.62 
6.80*** 
Sample size  560 105  
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Table 3: Decision to issue rights issue of standalone warrants than standalone rights issue of equity 
This table provides probit regression analysis using DSW as a dependent variable.  DSW takes value of one for standalone warrants and zero for stand alone rights issue of equity. The independent 
variables are RUNUP: raw return for one year period prior to the announcement date (return from -260 to day -2); IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of the market model 
regression of daily stock returns over the period from day-260 to day -61; LTA: the logarithm of the total assets of the issuing firm at the balance sheet date prior to the announcement;   Top20: the 
proportion of shares held by top 20 shareholders; BH: Blockholders (holders of 5% or more) ownership; DEBTRATIO: the total debt to total assets; LTOPTOMV is the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
total proceeds to market value. * Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Constant 
 
-0.3712 
(-3.38)** * 
-0.4347 
(-2.33)** 
-0.6548 
(-6.01) *** 
-1.4003 
(-11.68)*** 
-2.5561 
(-15.01)** * 
-1.0170 
(-17.06)*** 
-0.7542 
(-7.57)*** 
-3.9365 
(-5.88)** * 
-1.8989 
(-4..85)* ** 
-1.5116 
(-4.77)* ** 
-0.7952 
(-3.55)* ** 
0.1213 
(0.53) 
-0.0225 
(-0.15) 
0.0781 
(0.035) 
-0.1165 
(-0.84) 
LTA 
 
-0.2719 
(-6.51)** * 
      -0.6838 
(-5.82)* ** 
-0.3676 
(-6.26)* ** 
  -0.2649 
(-5.66)* ** 
-0.2613 
(-5.54)* ** 
-0.2640 
(-6.25)* ** 
-0.2600 
(-6.08)* ** 
Top 20 
 
 -0.9633 
(-3.19) *** 
      -0.6988 
(-1.48) 
 -0.8052 
(-2.36)* * 
-0.6220 
(-1.68)*  
 -0.8132 
(-2.30)* * 
 
BH   -1.0309 
(-3.65) *** 
    -1.1031 
(-1.36) 
 -1.5755 
(-2.81)* ** 
  -0.7166 
(-2.16) ** 
 -0.8845 
(-2.74)* ** 
IDYRISK 
 
   6.7852 
(3.70)*** 
   12.7234 
(3.10)* ** 
6.6898 
(2.74)* ** 
12.7986 
(3.30)* ** 
7.577 
(3.75)* ** 
    
LTOPTOMV 
 
    -0.8217 
(-10.80)** * 
  -1.8327 
(-7.60)* ** 
-0.9596 
(-8.53)* ** 
      
RUNUP 
 
     0.2515 
(4.74)*** 
 0.0952 
(1.00) 
0.0577 
(1.00) 
0.4047 
(4.25)* ** 
0.2448 
(4.38)* ** 
0.2412 
(4.36)* ** 
0.2415 
(4.42)* ** 
0.2594 
(4.56)* ** 
0.2585 
(4.63)* ** 
DEBTRATIO 
 
      -0.8417 
(-2.64)*** 
-0.5368 
(-1.39) 
-0.2157 
(-1.04) 
-1.4989 
(-2.07)* * 
-0.6286 
(-2.10)* * 
-0.5241 
(-2.09)* * 
-0.4992 
(-2.00)* * 
  
McFaden R2 0.0772 0.0164 0.0245 0.0208 0.2858 0.0355 0.0346 0.4309 0.4242 0.1036 0.0953 0.1359 0.1398 0.1211 0.1265 
LR statistic 44.78 9.53 14.22 12.05 165.81 20.57 20.08 249.96 246.10 60.13 55.26 78.83 81.09 70.27 73.36 
P value 0.0000 0.0020 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 
N 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 665 
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Table 4: Price Reaction to rights issue of equity and warrant Announcements 
This table reports mean and median abnormal returns, and standardized residual test employing the market model for the 
announcement of standalone rights issue of equity and standalone rights issue of warrants for the announcement period day -1 to 
day 1. Panel B provides price reaction to rights issue of equity based on discount of the offer price relative to share price ten days 
prior to the announcement. Panel C provides price reaction to rights issue of standalone warrants based on EPTOSP classifying the 
sample into in-the money and out-of-the-money. EPTOSP: the exercise price divided by share price two days before announcement 
date. Panel D provides price reaction to rights issue of standalone warrants based on in-the-money, moderately out-of-the-money 
and deep-out-of-the-money. This table also provides parametric t-test and ANOVA statistics; and nonparametric Mann-Whitney and 
Kruskal Wallis test statistics for the difference in mean/median abnormal returns across the different groupings. * Significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level and ***significantly different from zero at 
the 1% level. 
 
Rights issue of 
standalone warrant Rights issue of equity 
t-test 
(MW test) 
MEAN (%) 1.95 -1.82 2.83*** 
MEDIAN (%) 0.59 -0.46 (2.22)** 
SRT (3.46)*** (-6.46)***  
Sample size 105 560  
Panel  B - Rights issue of  Equity: Price Reactions  and Discount 
 Zero discount or premium Discount  
MEAN (%) 1.77 -2.37 2.48** 
MEDIAN (%) 0.63 -0.71 (8.31) *** 
SRT (2.22) ** (-7.96) ***  
Sample size 66 494  
Panel  C - Rights issue of  Standalone Warrants: Price Reactions  and EPTOSP 
 EPTOSP <1 EPTOSP≥1  
MEAN (%) 0.04 2.48 1.69* 
MEDIAN (%) -1.40 0.72 (1.73)* 
SRT (-0.44) (4.14) ***  
Sample size 23 82  
Panel  D - Rights issue of  Standalone Warrants: Price Reactions  and EPTOSP:  
In the money, moderately out-of-the-money and deeply out of the money 
 EPTOSP <1  2 >EPTOSP≥1 EPTOSP≥2 
Anova test 
(KW tests) 
 
MEAN (%) 0.04 4.45 -2.43 4.01** 
MEDIAN (%) -1.40 2.61 -0.69 (7.11)** 
SRT (-0.44) (5.82) *** (-1.87) *  
Sample size 23 54 28  
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Table 5: Price Reaction to standalone warrant Announcements: the impact of underwriting status, 
takeup and renounceability 
This table reports mean and median abnormal returns, and standardized residual test employing the market model for the 
announcement of standalone warrants to shareholders for the announcement period day -1 to day 1. Panel A reports the price 
reaction based on underwriting status. Panel B reports the price reaction based on median takeup of standalone warrants. Panel A 
reports the price reaction based on renounceability. This table also provides parametric t-test and nonparametric Mann-Whitney test 
statistics for the difference in mean/median abnormal returns across the different groupings. * Significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Panel A – Standalone Warrants: Underwritten versus non-underwritten 
 All Under written Non-Underwritten 
t-test 
(MW test) 
 
MEAN (%) 1.95 3.55 0.37 1.74* 
MEDIAN (%) 0.59 2.13 -0.23 (1.67)* 
SRT (3.46)*** (3.76)*** (1.14)  
Sample size 105 52 53  
Panel  B - Standalone Warrants: Price Reactions Based on Takeup < Median VS Takeup .>  Median   
 Takeup >  Median   Takeup < Median 
t-test 
(MW test) 
 
MEAN (%) 5.30 -0.77 2.38** 
MEDIAN (%) 2.74 -1.31 (2.87)*** 
SRT (5.43) *** (-1.38)  
Sample size 44 44  
Panel C – Standalone Warrants: renounceable  versus non-renounceable 
 Renounceable Non-renounceable 
t-test 
(MW test) 
 
MEAN (%) 1.92 2.14 0.47 
MEDIAN (%) 0.59 0.17 (0.20) 
SRT (1.71)* (3.08)***  
Sample size 10 95  
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Table 6: Interaction of underwriting status and moneyness of warrants 
Panel A of this table provide information on firms characteristics and abnormal returns for subgroups classified based in the interaction between moneyness and underwriting 
status. Panel B provides percentage of shareholders takeup of warrants for these groups.  
  Underwritten & 
EPTOSP <1 
 Underwritten & 
2 >EPTOSP≥1 
Underwritten & 
EPTOSP≥2 
Non-underwritten & 
EPTOSP <1 
 Non-underwritten & 
2 >EPTOSP≥1 
Non-underwritten 
& EPTOSP≥2 
KW test 
Panel A – Abnormal returns and Firms’ characterestics 
Abnormal returns 
(day -1 to +1) 
Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
4.47 
1.13 
6.25 
5.92 
0.71 
0.83 
-3.36 
-2.94 
3.80 
1.62 
-6.05 
-4.66 
13.50** 
SETDEV Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
5.89 
5.78 
6.09 
5.71 
7.78 
7.22 
5.51 
5.49 
6.31 
6.11 
7.75 
7.34 
9.94* 
TTM (years) Mean 
Median 
2.78 
2.58 
3.11 
3.08 
3.59 
3.16 
3.22 
2.21 
2.32 
2.45 
4.14 
3.55 
13.22** 
BM Mean 
Median 
0.55 
0.51 
0.96 
0.75 
0.77 
0.47 
0.42 
0.33 
0.87 
0.66 
0.89 
0.51 
8.33 
MV Mean 
Median 
31.10 
13.27 
14.64 
6.53 
8.40 
6.37 
39.77 
15.07 
21.66 
13.82 
5.04 
5.35 
25.50*** 
EPTOSP Mean 
Median 
0.77 
0.82 
1.37 
1.31 
3.59 
3.23 
0.71 
0.74 
1.28 
1.18 
2.76 
2.70 
87.58*** 
IPTOSP Mean 
Median 
0.085 
0.063 
0.14 
0.13 
0.18 
0.11 
0.18 
0.12 
0.11 
0.07 
0.27 
0.28 
24.34*** 
RUNUP Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
56.58 
52.73 
15.97 
11.31 
-34.13 
-38.49 
5.11 
12.78 
5.78 
-10.27 
-58.94 
-53.77 
20.67*** 
TOPTOMV Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
5.82 
2.81 
12.27 
9.49 
14.60 
9.52 
12.26 
6.65 
5.90 
4.22 
17.03 
13.30 
24.61*** 
TOP$ Mean 
Median 
0.98 
0.34 
0.78 
0.75 
1.04 
0.61 
4.20 
1.52 
1.40 
0.32 
0.97 
0.75 
6.81 
N  10 27 15 13 27 13  
Panel B – shareholders takeup  
Takeup Mean (%) 
Median (%) 
79.13 
82.33 
81.62 
85.31 
64.29 
60.09 
73.77 
74.28 
69.55 
72.31 
54.95 
45.15 
10.66** 
N  8 21 15 9 23 13  
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Table 7: Cross-sectional regression analysis of abnormal price reaction – Total Sample: Standalone equity and warrants 
This table provides cross-sectional regression results explaining the market response to standalone equity and warrant announcements. The dependent variable used in this regression is the three-day abnormal price movement from 
the day before the announcement to the day after the announcement date of the rights issue employing the market model. Independent variables are LTOPTOMV: the natural logarithm of the ratio of total proceeds to market value; DFU 
takes value of one for fully underwritten rights issue of equity/standalone warrants and zero otherwise; DRIGHTS takes value of one for standalone rights issue of equity and zero for standalone warrants; .DSW takes value of one for 
standalone warrants and zero for stand alone rights issue of equity. TAKEUP: actual percentage takeup of the standalone equity/warrants; EPTOSP: the exercise price divided by share price two days before announcement date; 
DEPTOSP12: a dummy variable equal to unity if EPTOSP takes between 1 and 2; DEPTOSP≥2: a dummy variable equal to unity if EPTOSP takes value greater than or equal to 2; DIMOM takes a value of unity if EPTOSP is 
greater than one otherwise zero; DEBTRATIO: the total debt to total assets; RUNUP: raw return for one year period prior to the announcement date (return from -260 to day -2); IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk 
measured as the standard error of the market model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day-260 to day -61; LTA: the logarithm of the market value of the issuing firm at the balance sheet date 
prior to the announcement;  Top20: the proportion of shares held by top 20 shareholders; BM: the book-to-market ratio measured as book value of assets to market value of assets;  and DDISC: takes value of 1 if 
rights issue of equity is issued with zero discount or premium and zero otherwise. 
 Total Sample Warrant Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Constant -0.0233 
(-2.66)*** 
0.0195 
(1.64) 
-0.0129 
(-0.67) 
-0.0237 
(-4.04)*** 
-0.0237 
(-4.24)*** 
-0.0242 
(-4.20)*** 
-0.0361 
(-4.43)*** 
-0.0678 
(-4.38)*** 
-0.0100 
(-0.41) 
-0.0264 
(-1.03) 
-0.0010 
(-0.40) 
-0.0243 
(-0..94) 
-0.0720 
(-4.55)*** 
-0.0356 
(-4.23)*** 
-0.0811 
(-1.06) 
-0.1981 
(-2.07)** 
-0.2079 
(-2.12)** 
LTOPTOMV 
 
-0.0070 
(-1.83)* 
       0.0012 
(0.23) 
0.0047 
(0.82) 
0.0017 
(0.33) 
0.0049 
(0.88) 
  0.0132 
(0.66) 
0.0283 
(1.19) 
0.0275 
(1.16) 
DEPTOSP12 
 
              0.0746 
(2.39)** 
0.0799 
(2.29)** 
 
DEPTOSP12 
*EPTOSP 
                0.0539 
(2.03)** 
DRIGHTS  -0.0383 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.0417 
(-2.99)*** 
              
DFU   0.0240 
(2.32)** 
   0.0203 
(2.06)** 
0.0268 
(2.64)*** 
0.0184 
(1.81)* 
0.0252 
(2.35)** 
0.0189 
(1.87)* 
0.0265 
(2.49)*** 
0.0255 
(2.49)*** 
0.0195 
(1.96)* 
0.0542 
(1.88)* 
0.0646 
(2.14)** 
0.0604 
(2.01) ** 
TAKEUP   0.0335 
(2.04)* 
    0.0412 
(2.33)** 
0.0184 
(1.81)* 
0.0355 
(1.74)* 
 0.0314 
(1.53) 
0.0482 
(2.74)*** 
  0.1363 
(1.99)** 
0.1425 
(2.07)** 
DRIGHTS*DDISC 
 
   0.0414 
(4.05)*** 
0.0415 
(4.11)*** 
0.0401 
(4.08)*** 
0.0431 
(4.21)*** 
0.0558 
(4.64)*** 
0.0503 
(4.11)*** 
0.0600 
(4.59)*** 
0.0485 
(4.01)*** 
0.0569 
(4.37)*** 
0.0573 
(4.69)*** 
0.0429 
(4.15)*** 
   
DSW*DIMOM 
 
   0.0512 
(3.51)*** 
    0.0610 
(3.47)*** 
0.0675 
(3.68)*** 
       
DSW* DEPTOSP12 
 
    0.0799 
(4.39)*** 
 0.0826 
(4.54)*** 
0.0934 
(4.61)*** 
  0.0859 
(4.18)*** 
0.1011 
(4.52)*** 
0.0563 
(3.72)*** 
0.0534 
(3.68)*** 
   
DSW*DEPTOSP>2 
 
     -0.0581 
(-1.89)* 
           
IDYRISK 
 
        -0.5157 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.5478 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.4579 
(-2.29)** 
-0.4880 
(-2.57)*** 
  0.2624 
(0.54) 
0.7375 
(1.28) 
0.7747 
(1.30) 
RUNUP 
 
        0.0060 
(1.09) 
0.0059 
(1.17) 
0.0048 
(0.88) 
0.0044 
(0.89) 
  0.0069 
(0.86) 
0.0089 
(1.10) 
0.0079 
(0.97) 
BM 
 
        -0.0062 
(-0.74) 
-0.0017 
(0.83) 
-0.0059 
(-0.72) 
-0.0009 
(-0.12) 
  -0.0437 
(-1.71)* 
-0.0633 
(-2.38)** 
-0.0657 
(-2.41)** 
DEBTRATIO 
 
        0.0006 
(0.04) 
-0.0015 
(0.08) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.0026 
(-0.14) 
  -0.0475 
(-0.95) 
-0.0698 
(-1.17) 
-0.075 
(-1.24) 
TOP20 
 
        0.0171 
(0.68) 
0.0068 
(0.24) 
0.0125 
(0.51) 
0.0024 
(0.09) 
  0.0995 
(1.48) 
0.0843 
(1.13) 
0.0905 
(1.18) 
LTA 
 
        -0.0007 
(-0.18) 
-0.0013 
(-0.34) 
-0.0004 
(-0.11) 
-0.0012 
(-0.31) 
  -0.0012 
(-0.07) 
0.0140 
(0.89) 
0.0155 
(0.99) 
Adj R2 0.0021 0.0105 0.0261 0.0215 0.0338 0.0195 0.0384 0.0641 0.0330 0.0518 0.0419 0.0655 0.0472 0.0256 0.0746 0.1585 0.1505 
F Statistics 2.42 8.02 6.04 8.29 12.60 9..99 9.83 10.65 3.26 3.80 3.91 4.59 7.99 6.82 1.93 2.66 2.56 
P value 0.1203 0.0048 0.0047 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0564 0.0075 0.0099 
N 665 665 565 665 665 665 665 565 665 565 665 565 565 565 105 88 88 
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Table 8: Determinants of Standalone warrants Takeup 
This table models shareholders takeup of warrants in a Tobit regression setting. The dependent variable is the actual percentage 
takeup by existing shareholders.  The independent variables are DFU: dummy variable indicating  underwritten standalone 
warrants; EPTOSP: the exercise price divided by share price two days before announcement; RUNUP: raw return for one year 
period prior to the announcement date (return from -260 to day -2); IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard 
error of the market model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day-260 to day -61; LTA: the logarithm of the 
market value of the issuing firm at the balance sheet date prior to the announcement;  Top20: the proportion of shares held by top 
20 shareholders; DEBTRATIO: the total debt to total assets; LTOPTOMV: the natural logarithm of the ratio of total proceeds to market 
value; and LNOP: the logarithm of the offer proceeds.  * Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.8817 
(6.47)
***
 
0.9457 
(6.76)
***
 
0.8850 
(8.25)
***
 
0.6313 
(8.50) 
0.8931 
(15.45)
***
 
0.8914 
(15.22)
***
 
DFU 0.1208 
(2.57)
**
 
0.1121 
(2.39)
***
 
0.1226 
(2.64)
***
 
0.1232 
(2.50)
**
 
0.1225 
(2.72)
***
 
0.1248 
(2.67)
***
 
EPTOSP -0.0401 
(-2.40)
**
 
-0.0503 
(-3.28)
***
 
-0.0419 
(-2.45)
**
 
-0.0479 
(-2.91)
***
 
-0.0510 
(-3.29)
***
 
-0.0446 
(-2.54)
**
 
RUNUP 0.0080 
(0.53) 
0.0213 
(1.42) 
      
IDYRISK -2.8454 
(-3.06)
***
 
-3.0252 
(-3.05)
***
 
-2.8904 
(-3.12)
***
 
 -2.7034 
(-3.16)
***
 
-2.5333 
(-3.17)
*** 
LTA -0.0297 
(-1.61) 
-0.0210 
(-0.73) 
-0.0318 
(-1.75)
*
 
     
Top 20 -0.0389 
(0.31) 
0.0115 
(0.09) 
      
DEBTRATIO 0.0496 
(0.62) 
0.0757 
(1.15) 
      
LTOPTOMV 
 
-0.0337 
(-1.61) 
 -0.0308 
(-1.54) 
-0.0370 
(-1.78)
*
 
  
LNOP 
  
 -0.0496 
(-2.33)
**
 
  -0.0518 
(-3.15)
***
 
  
Log likelihood 14.07 16.53 13.79 8.38 15.13 11.54 
N 88 88 88 88 88 88 
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Table 9: Determinants of EPTOSP  
This table provides cross-sectional regression analysis using EPTOSP as a dependent variable.  The independent variables are DFU: dummy variable indicating underwritten standalone warrants; 
Top20: the proportion of shares held by top 20 shareholders; TTM: the term to maturity of issued standalone warrants; STDEV: standard deviation of daily return for the year prior to the announcement; 
LTA: the logarithm of the total assets of the issuing firm at the balance sheet date prior to the announcement and LTOPTOMV: the natural logarithm of the ratio of total proceeds to market value. * Significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Constant 
 
1.5010 
(13.15)** * 
2.2245 
(6.68) 
1.1251 
(4.70)** * 
1.0572 
(5.02)** * 
1.8783 
(8.98)** * 
1.7510 
(14.01)** * 
2.2527 
(7.83)** * 
1.4643 
(2.66)** * 
1.0011 
(2.35)** 
1.5678 
(3.26)** * 
0.8621 
(3.28)** * 
DFU 
 
0.3959 
(1.72)* 
      0.3209 
(1.44) 
0.3604 
(1.64) 
 0.4076 
(1.81)* 
Top 20 
 
 -0.9491 
(-1.56) 
     -1.1527 
(-1.98)* 
-1.2338 
(-2.09)**  
-1.1708 
(-1.97)* 
 
TTM (years) 
 
  0.1854 
(2.30)* * 
    0.1824 
(2.17)* * 
0.1783 
(2.21)* * 
0.1901 
(2.14)* * 
 
STDEV 
 
   9.8406 
(2.99)** * 
   9.1594 
(2.60)** 
10.7831 
(2.85)** * 
9.7041 
(2.74)** * 
10.7116 
(2.76)** * 
LTA 
 
    -0.1031 
(-1.12) 
  -0.0363 
(-0.42) 
   
RUNUUP 
 
     -0.1400 
(-1.85)* 
 -0.1185 
(-1.72)* 
-0.1257 
(-1.85)* 
-0.1065 
(-1.67)* 
-0.1649 
(-2.29)*** 
LTOPTOMV 
 
      0.2027 
(2.14)**  
0.1221 
(1.48) 
 0.1447 
(1.77)* 
 
Adj R2 0.0187 0.0199 0.0523 0.0321 0.0018 0.0193 0.0273 0.1384 0.1405 0.1348 0.0814 
F statistic 
P value 
2.99 
0.0870 
2.10 
0.1508 
6.74 
0.0148 
4.45 
0.0373 
1.19 
0.2778 
3.04 
0.0841 
3.92 
0.0543 
3.39 
0.0028 
4.39 
0.0012 
4.24 
0.0016 
4.07 
0.0089 
N 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
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Table 10: Decision to issue fully underwritten standalone warrants  
This table provides probit regression analysis using DFU as a dependent variable.  The independent variables are EPTOSP: 
the exercise price divided by share price two days before announcement; RUNUP: raw return for one year period prior to the 
announcement date (return from -260 to day -2); IDYRISK: the idiosyncratic risk measured as the standard error of the market 
model regression of daily stock returns over the period from day-260 to day -61; LTA: the logarithm of the total assets of the 
issuing firm at the balance sheet date  prior to the announcement;  and  Top20: the proportion of shares held by top 20 
shareholders;. * Z-statistics are provided in parenthesis. Significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level, and ***significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 
 
-0.3451 
(-1.64) 
0.0482 
(0.12) 
-2.2769 
(-2.07)** 
-3.0422 
(-2.66) *** 
-2.5547 
(-2.06)** 
EPTOSP 
 
0.1994 
(2.00)** 
  0.2362 
(2.10) ** 
0.2194 
(1.95)* 
Top 20 
 
 -0.1083 
(-0.16) 
8.8914 
(2.23) ** 
10.0412 
(2.51) ** 
9.7209 
(2.32) ** 
Top 20Sq 
 
  -7.8985 
(-2.31) ** 
-8.6955 
(-2.54) ** 
-8.3254 
(-2.31) ** 
IDYRISK 
 
    -1.5548 
(-0.26) 
LTA 
 
    -0.0413 
(-0.32) 
BM 
 
    0.0408 
(0.20) 
RUNUP 
 
    0.0504 
(0.57) 
DEBTRATIO 
 
    0.2673 
(0.51) 
LTOPTOMV 
 
    0.0877 
(0.68) 
McFaden R2 0.0217 0.0002 0.0370 0.0638 0.0741 
LR statistic 3.16 0.0241 5.39 9.28 10.79 
P value 0.0752 0.8767 0.0675 0.0258 0.2906 
N 105 105 105 105 105 
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